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"I Vote This Way Because I'm
Wrong": The Supreme Court Justice as
Epimenides
By JoHN M. RoGERs*
INTRODUCTION
Possibly the most unsettling phenomenon m the Supreme Court's
1988 term was Justice White's decision to vote contrary to his own
exhaustively stated reasoning in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.' His
unexplained. decision to vote against the result of his own analysis
lends support to those who argue that law, or at least constitutional
law, is fundamentally indeterminate. Proponents of the mdetermi-
nacy argument sometimes base their position on the allegedly mes-
capable inconsistency of decisions made by a multi-member court.
There is an answer to the inconsistency argument, but it founders
if justices sometimes vote, without explanation, on the basis of their
colleagues' determinations with which they disagree. This is just
* William Lafferty Professor, Umversity of Kentucky College of Law. B.A. 1970,
Stanford Umversity; J.D. 1974, Umversity of Michigan.
I - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989). Epimemdes the Cretan is reported to have
said, "All Cretans are liars." D. HorsTnTaR, METAMAGJCiAL MHE": QuzsTNo FOR THE
ESSENCH OF Mn;D AnD PATrERN 7 (1985); Titus 1:12; see generally Hicks, The Liar Paradox
in Legal Reasoning, 29 CA~maDmai L.J. 275 (1971). For fascinating variations on the Epimen-
ides paradox outside of the legal field, see D. HopsTADTER, G6DEL, Esam, BACH: AN
ETEmwA. GomEr BRAw 5-24 (1980). Self-referential statements like the Epimemdes paradox
lie at the heart of Kurt G6del's remarkable Incompleteness Theorem. Id. at 15-19.
Following the preparation of this article, Justice Kennedy voted against his own
position in Arizona v. Fulmmante, - U.S. -, 59 U.S.L.W 4235 (U.S., March 26,
1991). His vote was analogous to Justice White's m Union Gas. See n. 124, infra.
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what Justice White did when he cast the deciding vote to affrm the
lower court's decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.
Justice White acted contrary to the overwhelming weight of
precedent, as will be demonstrated below His vote is anomalous
because justices almost always vote to reverse or affirm based purely
on their independent analysis, regardless of the majority's rejection
of a portion of that analysis. Justice Scalia followed the normal rule
in the very same case by dissenting.2 In Union Gas, Justices White
and Scalia each reached different conclusions regarding the effect
of a majority's rejection of part of his analysis, but these different
conclusions were neither explained nor apparently even perceived.
Yet Justice White's opimon determined the resolution of the case,
and also arguably made a difference as to what the law will'be in
the future. How a justice determines when to follow his or her own
analysis or to defer to the majority on an issue bears some exami-
nation. Justices ought to be able to articulate reasons why they act
or do not act upon their own legal views.
Union Gas involied whether a state could be held liable as a
third-party defendant for clean-up costs under sections 104 and 106
of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (hereinafter CERCLA).3
Justice Brennan wrote a plurality opinion upholding the lower
court's decision. He and Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and
Scalia found that the language of CERCLA evinced an intent to
hold states liable. Justices White, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Ken-
nedy disagreed. Justice Brennan and Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
Stevens, and White found that the Constitution permitted Congress
to create such a cause of action when legislating pursuant to the
commerce clause, but Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, O'Connor, and
Kennedy disagreed.
The opinions can be summarized as follows. If X is "the lan-
guage of CERCLA permits suit against a state in federal court,"
and Y is "the Constitution permits Congress to create such a cause
of action when legislating pursuant to the commerce clause,"
(1) X & Y Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens;
(2) not X & Y White;
(3) X & not Y Scalia;
(4) not X & not Y Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy
2 Pennsylvama v. Umon Gas Co., -U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2303 (1989) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1980).
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All agreed that if both X and Y were present, then the lower court's
holding that Pennsylvania may be liable would be upheld (result r),
but if either X or Y were not present, then the lower court's holding
would be reversed (not r). Applying the rule X and Y require r,
otherwise not r, there would be five votes for not r. Only four
justices accepted both premises necessary for upholding state liabil-
ity. Yet the decision and holding of the Court was that Pennsylvania
may be liable. This happened because Justice White accepted the
judgment of the majority of the Court, even though he disagreed
and argued vigorously for six pages to the contrary that the language
of CERCLA did not show sufficient intent to hold states liable:
My view on the statutory issue has not prevailed, however; a
majority of the Court has ruled that the statute, as amended,
plainly intended to abrogate the immunity of the States from suit
in the federal courts. I accept that judgment. This bnngs me to
the question whether Congress has the constitutional power to
abrogate the States' immunity [He agreed that it does.]
Accordingly, I would affirm (footnote omitted).4
Justice White could just as easily have stated the following:
Because the statute does not abrogate the immunity of the
States from suit in the federal courts, it does not matter whether
or not Congress has the constitutional power to do so, although I
agree that it does. Accordingly, I would reverse.
Justice White gave no further explanation for Ins decision to
defer to the majority with whom he disagreed. Justice Scalia, on
the other hand, voted to reverse without any express consideration
of whether to accept the majority's rejection of his view of the
Constitution. But he could have said something analogous to the
words of Justice White:
My view on the constitutional issue has not prevailed, however;
a majority of the Court has ruled that Congress has the constitu-
tional power to abrogate the States' Immunity and I accept that
judgment.. This brings me to the question whether the statute, as
amended, plainly intended to abrogate the immunity of the States
from suit in the federal courts. [He agreed that it does.]
Accordingly, I would affirm
What reasons might there be for such different approaches to a
justice's ruling on the basis that he or she is wrong? Is there law
4 109 S. Ct. at 2295 (White, J., concurrng) (footnote omitted).
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on the subject, or is the determnation committed to the discretion
of the individual justice? Should it be? If there is law, why is it not
articulated? To answer these questions, the logical first step is to
see how Supreme Court justices have answered them m the past.
Part I of this Articl begins to answer the previously stated
questions by reference to some 150 Supreme Court cases that might
have resulted in a justice's decision to vote against his own analysis.5
In these cases no justice took the occasion presented to decide a
case contrary to his own logic. Part II completes the discussion of
precedent by exploring six additional cases in which justices did
apparently vote against their own deternunation of the law in the
cases before them. For several reasons, none of these cases provides
an adequate basis for the decision made by Justice White in Union
Gas.6 Part III discusses several possible policy goals that might have
driven Justice White to vote as he did. 7 This Article concludes that
a Supreme Court justice should not vote contrary to his own stated
analysis, because such action is harmful and destabilizing to the
determinacy of the law
I. A SHORT TAXONOMY OF PRECEDENTS
A. Appellate Decisions and the Basics of Propositional Logic
The only way to grasp the extent to which the justices have
refrained from doing what Justice White did is to examine precedent
to determine when such an action might have previously occurred.
At the outset it is necessary to ascertain the pool of situations where
a justice or justices faced the possibility of deferring to the majority
vote of others on an issue that would have caused a different result
in the case. The possibility only exists when each of at least two
legal premises is needed to reach a particular result.
The situation can be described abstractly as follows: Assume
everyone agrees that both legal premise X and legal premise Y are
necessary to reach decision R, reversal. If three justices determine
X but not Y, three justices determine Y but not X, and three justices
determine both X and Y, then if each justice looks solely to his or
her own analysis, only three justices will vote to reverse, and the
judgment will instead be A, affirmance. But if the first three justices
See infra notes 8-56 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 57-77 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 78-122 and accompanymng text.
SURErME COURT VOTING
yield to the six others with respect to the issue of Y, m spite of
their own judgment, then the case will be reversed.
There are about 150 Supreme Court cases in which a justice
might have deferred to the majority's resolution of an issue, thereby
affecting the result of a case. The clearest examples are cases like
Pennsylvania v Union Gas Co.,' in which all justices expressed their
views on both X and Y 9 For instance, in NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon
Co.10 the NLRB required an employer to provide a list of its
employees' names and addresses to unions seeking to organize the
employees. The Board based its decision on its earlier Excelsior
ruling, which had enunciated a general requirement that employment
lists be furnished to unions. The two premises required for reversing
the NLRB were roughly as follows: (X) the Excelsior "rule" was
improperly promulgated under the Administrative Procedure Act,
and (Y) if the Excelsior rule were improperly promulgated, then the
agency decision must be reversed even if the agency could have
made the same decision without relying on Excelsior. There was no
question that X and Y together would have required reversing the
agency action, and Justices Douglas1 and Harlan 12 so voted. Justice
Fortas and three others adopted X but expressly rejected Y 13 Justice
Black and two others expressly adopted Y but rejected X.14 The
result was to uphold the agency action, despite the fact that a
majority supported each of the two parts of the syllogism (X & Y),
and no one doubted the overall syllogism (X & Y require R).
This problem potentially arises every time a majority is made
up of (1) a plurality, and (2) a concurrence that refuses to adopt a
necessary portion of the plurality's analysis. This occurs whenever
- U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 2273 (1989).
See Amiencan Trucking Ass'ns v. Smith, .U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2323 (1990);
Michael H. and Victona D. v. Gerald D., _____U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2333 (1989); Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.,
448 U.S. 261 (1980); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Gosa v. Mayden, 413 -U.S. 665
(1973); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970); NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969); Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961);
National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949); Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77 (1949); United States v. Alcea Band, 329 U.S. 40 (1946). This class of cases also
may include North Dakota v. United States, -U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 1986 (1990) and
Metromedia v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
394 U.S. 759 (1969).
" Id. at 775-80 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
12 Id. at 780-83 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
n Id. at 761-69.
14 Id. at 769-75 (Black, J., concurring in the result).
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there is any substantive difference in the holdings of a plurality
decision and a concurrence.15
But what about those situations where either one of two premises
is sufficient for a decision, and the plurality adopts one, the con-
currence another? For instance, X or Y requires R. The situation is
not really different if we assume that without X or Y then A (not
R) is required. That is usually the situation in appellate cases: if one
of several alternative bases for reversal is not adopted, the lower
court's decision is upheld. 16 In terms of propositional logic, this
point can be demonstrated by starting with the following statement:
if (X or Y), then R, otherwise A.
Tius can be stated another way as,
if and only if (X or Y), then R.
That in turn is the same as saying,
if and only if (not.(X or Y)), then A.
Since (not (X or Y9) is the logical equivalent of (not X and not Y),
we can say,
if and only if (not X and not Y), then A.
In sum, this proves that
if and only if (X or Y), then R
is the logical equivalent of
if and only if (not X and not Y), then A.
In other words, if either of two grounds is sufficient for reversal,
and no other grounds are properly presented, then affirmance is
required if ground X and ground Y are each rejected. A court
determination resulting from one of several disjunctive premises can
be stated as well in the conjunctive by stating that the opposite
results from the conjunction of the negative of each of the prem-
ises. 17
Is Supreme Court judgments without majority opuuons have been analyzed and criticized
as their frequency has increased. See Davis & Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions
in the Supreme Court, 1974 DuKE L.J. 59; Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court
Plurality Decisions, 80 CoLum. L. REv. 756 (1980); Note, Plurality Decisions and Judicial
Decisionmaking, 94 HARv. L. Ray. 1127 (1981); Note, Lower Court Disavowal of Supreme
Court Precedent, 60 VA.L.Rav. 494 (1974); Comment, A Suggestion for the Prevention of
No-Clear-Majority Judicial Decisions, 46 T"x. L. REv. 370 (1968); Comment, Supreme Court
No-Clear-Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare Decisis, 24 U. Cm. L. REv. 99 (1956); see
also Swisher, The Supreme Court-Need for Re-Evaluation, 40 VA. L. Rav. 837 (1954).
26 If R can result even without X or Y, then there must be another sufficient premise
for R-let's call it Z-such that if X or Y or Z, then R. There may be even more reasons to
reverse a lower court's decision, but issues are usually limited on appeal, and if the appellant
does not win on any of those issues, then the lower court's decision is upheld. Thus we can
assume a limited number of alternative bases for reversal.
'7 Conversely, the situation in Wyman-Gordon could have been stated in the disjunctive:
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Most cases involving a disagreeing plurality and concurrence can
be categorized in one of the following ways:
(1) If X and Y, then A,
(2) If X and Y, then R;
(3) If X or Y, then A;
(4) If X or Y, then R.
Since statements X and Y can include negations, it follows from the
above discussion that each of the latter two formulations can be
stated as one of the first two. For instance, assume X is "the statute
of limitations has run" and Y is "the defendant has immunity " If
these are the only issues raised on an appeal from a lower court's
decision allowing recovery, then all would agree:
(4) If X or Y, then R, otherwise A.
But we could just as easily assign to X and Y the opposite values:
assume X is "the statute of limitations has not run" and Y is "the
defendant is not immune." Then instead we have:
(2) If X and Y, then A, otherwise R.
All situations (3) and (4) can thus be expressed in the form of either
(1) or (2).
Now we can generalize an appellate judgment of affirmance (A)
or reversal (R) simply as result (r). Thus, every situation involving
a plurality and concurrence-at least where one of the two opinions
does not accept a necessary element of the other's analysis-can be
expressed as follows:
If X and Y, then r, otherwise not r.
B. Cases Containing Formal Differences
Most plurality opinion cases can be parsed this way Such cases
constitute most of the relevant pool to be used to determine what
Supreme Court justices have done in the past when presented with
the opportunity to defer to a disagreeing majority on part of their
analysis. Some cases with plurality opinions, however, may involve
merely formal differences. Justices may disagree over the way to
say things that they agree upon. Perhaps the most striking example
is Flood v Kuhn, 8 in which Justices Burger 9 and White2° concurred
if the Excelsior rule were properly promulgated (not X), or such an error does not invalidate
the subsequent adjudicatory decision if the subsequent decision could have been arrived at
independently (not Y), then upholding the agency decision is required (not R).
U 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
,9 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 285-86 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (Burger also
expressed a desire for congressional action).
Id. at 285 (white, J., concurring).
1990-91]
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in an opinion by Justice Blackmun upholding the exemption of
professional baseball from federal and state antitrust laws, but
refused to join that part of the majority opinion that described
the colorful history of the game of baseball. Sometimes
Justices prefer to explain themselves in a shorter 2 1 or
21 See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, -U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (Kennedy,
J., concurring); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1011 (1988) (Stevens,
J., concurring); Michael M. v. Sonoma County Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 481-88 (1981)
(Blackmun, J., concurring); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 245 (1978) (White, J., concur-
ring); Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 158 (1977) (White, J., concurring); id. at 158-
60 (Stevens, J., concurring); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 702-03 (1977)
(White, J., concurring); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 387-96 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring and dissenting); Kirby v. illinos, 406 U.S. 682, 691 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring);
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 509 (1961) (Brennan, J., concurring); Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S 568, 635-36 (1961) (Warren, C.J., concurring); DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144,
160-61 (1960) (Brennan, J., concurring); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1959) (Black,
J., concurring); Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Co.,
348 U.S. 437, 461 (1955) (Warren, C.J., concurring); Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478,
498 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring); Barnes v. The Railroads, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 294, 310
(1872) (Bradley, J., concurring).
Concurring justices may just be uncomfortable with decisions that they join. See, e.g.,
Teague v. Lane, -.._--U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1078-79 (1989) (White, J., concurring);
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1985) (Burger,
C.J., concurring); Ballew, 435 U.S. at 245-46 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); United States
v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 675-76 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Spevack v.
Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 519-20 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128,
138-39 (1954) (Clark, J., concurring).
Justices also may expressly reject part of a plurality opinion as superfluous, although
they otherwise concur to make a majority. E.g., Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, -U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2976 (1990) (O'Connor, J., joining only Parts I-
IV); id. at 2993-95 (Stevens, J., concurring); Jett v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., -...._U.S.
- , 109 S. Ct. 2702, 2724 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, -U.S.
- 109 S. Ct. 2037, 2053-54 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring); United States v. Bagley, 473
U.S. 667, 685 (1985) (White, J., concurring); United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 60 (Marshall, J., concurring); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 883-84 (1982) (White, J., concurring); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444,
470-71 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring); Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S.
682, 715 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 14748 (1973) (Blackmun, J., concurring); United States v. Sisson, 399
U.S. 267, 308 (1970) (Black, J., concurring); see also Beliotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 652-56
(1979) (Stevens, J., concurring); United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 171 (1977)
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 180 n.* (Stewart, J., concurring); Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
403 U.S. 443, 490-92 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.)
283, 410-11 (1849) (Wayne, J., concurring),
A concurring Justice also may agree with the plurality on a conimon dispositive ground,
but disagree on another issue. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., -...__U.S. - ,
109 S. Ct. 706, 734-35 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 735 (Scalia, J., concurring);
Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, 481 U.S. 787, 815-25 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 485-87 (1986) (White, J., concurring); id.
at 491 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 532-38 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
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longer2 fashion. In some cases the necessary fifth vote is provided
by a justice concurng without any opinion at all. In such situa-
concurrng); Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 485 (1972) (White, J., concumng); United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 20-26 (1956)(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2 Justices Frankfurter and Harlan provided the necessary votes for a majority in
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), and Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366
U.S. 617 (1961), with a separate opinion that begins as follows:
So deeply do the issues raised by these cases cut that it is not surprising
that no one opinion can wholly express the views even of all the members of
the Court who join in its result. Individual opinions in constitutional controver-
sies have been the practice throughout the Court's history. Such expression of
differences m view or even in emphasis converging toward the same result makes
for the clarity of candor and thereby enhances the authority of the judicial
process.
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 459 (1961) (footnote omitted) (Frankfurter, J., con-
currng) (This concurrence was used m McGowan and four other cases. It spans over one
hundred pages and includes an appendix featuring several fold-out charts.); see also California
v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 434-58 (1971) (Harlan, 3., concurring); United States v. Kaiser, 363
U.S. 299, 305-325 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Other cases in which concurrences can perhaps best be described as different statements
of similar reasoning are the following: Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 104-105 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. California Pub. Util. Comm'n, 475
U.S. 1, 21-26 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 973-76
(1982) (Stevens, J., concurring); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 755.62 (1978) (Powell,
J., concurring); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 513-21 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
concurring); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 305-308 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 660-65 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring); In re Stolar,
401 U.S. 23, 31 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 11-14
(1970) (Black, J., concurring); Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599, 622-28 (1962)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601-607 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurrng); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 466-72 (1947) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); Keegan, 325 U.S. at 495-98 (1945) (Black, J., concurring); see also Cassell v.
Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 290-96 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
= Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 38 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Bowen v.
Amencan Hosp. Assn., 476 U.S. 610, 648 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Robbins v.
California, 453 U.S. 420, 429 (1981) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Walter v. United States, 447
U.S. 649, 660 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring); American Export Lines v. Alvez, 446 U.S.
274, 286 (1980) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Gardner v. Honda, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977)
(Burger, C.J., concurring); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 209 (1973) (White, J., con-
currmng); Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 524 (1957) (Burton, J.,
concurnng); Bums v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 146 (1953) (Jackson, J., concuring); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 481 (1950) (Clark, J., concurring); Cox v. United
States, 332 U.S. 442, 455 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S.
145, 149 (1947) (Burton, J., concumng); Muhlker v. New York and Harlem R.R. Co., 197
U.S. 544, 571 (1905) (Brown, J., concurring); Lapeyre v. United States, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.)
191, 200 (1872) (Davis, J., concurring).
Similarly uninformative are concurrences that join only part of the plurality opinion, but
say nothing about the unjomed part. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 438 (1986); Segura
v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 797 n.t (1984); INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034
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tions it is difficult to ascertain whether differences between the
concurring and plurality opimons are stylistic or substantive.
C. Plurality Opinion Cases Based on Alternative Rationales
1. Both issues reached.
However, most plurality decisions contain alternative rationales.
In cases like Wyman-Gordon. where the justices express views on
both issue X and issue Y, we might most likely expect one justice
to defer to a majority of his or her colleagues in order to avoid the
anomaly of having a majority of judges determine X, and a majority
of judges determine Y, with everyone agreeing that X and Y require
R, yet instead having A. But in the fourteen or more times that the
opportunity has been presented squarely, the justices have consis-
tently voted otherwise, in accordance with their own positions.2
2. One issue not reached by some justices.
There are additional cases, however, in which the same oppor-
tunity to defer has been presented, although the opportunity was
perhaps not as obvious. In many cases justices did not reach the
second of two issues because they disposed of the case based upon
the first issue, while their colleagues decided the case based on the
second issue after resolving the first. For instance, in many cases
where X and Y required r, although some of the justices found X
but not Y, others simply found not X without reaching Y The
latter group could have found itself outvoted with respect to X and
therefore have been logically required to reach issue Y In Massa-
chusetts v Oakes,21 the defendant was convicted of violating a
subsequently amended state statute that prohibited adults from pos-
ing or exhibiting minors "in a state of nudity "2 One argument for
upholding the conviction was that an intervening amendment of the
statute mooted the question of whether the statute was constitution-
ally overbroad. We can assume that all justices agreed that if the
overbreadth issue were still alive (X), and if the statute were consti-
n.* (1984); see also Watson, 487 U.S. at 1011 (Stevens, J., concurring); Shapero v. Kentucky
Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 480 (1988) (White, J., concurring); United States v. Hams, 403
U.S. 573, 585 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring); id. (White, J., concurring).
24 See supra note 9.
- - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2633 (1989).
Massachusetts v. Oakes, -__U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2633, 2636 (1989).
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tutionally overbroad (Y), then the defendant's conviction could not
stand (r). Justices Scalia and Blackmun found that the overbreadth
issue was not moot, but that the statute was not overbroad (X &
not Y). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens in dissent agreed
with Justices Scalia and Blackmun that the issue was not moot, but
found that the statute was overbroad (X and Y). Justices O'Connor,
Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy found that the subsequent amend-
ment of the statute made overbreadth analysis inappropriate;, they
accordingly expressed no view of whether the statute was overbroad
on its face (not X and not reach Y). Thus, even though a majority
thought that the overbreadth question was viable, four justices (in-
cluding Justice White) refused to decide that issue. Twenty-nine or
more cases fit this mold.27
3. Two issues not reached by some justices
Even more opportunities to defer to a majority of the Court
have occurred m cases involving plurality decisions where, X and Y
being required for r, some justices find not-X and do not reach Y,
while other justices do not reach X and find not-.Y If all of the
justices rejecting r had reached the issue that they did not reach and
agreed with the dissent on that issue, then there would have been a
majority for each of X and Y, and deference to the majority on the
part of at least some of these justices would have meant a different
result (r instead of not-r).
7 See Stanford v. Kentucky, ... _-U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989); Kungys v. United
States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988); Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368 (1987); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480
U.S. 709 (1987); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986);
South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984); Michigan v. Clifford, 464
U.S. 287 (1984); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981); Brown v.
Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980); City of
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979); Parham v.
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979); Regents of the Umv. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978);
Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972); United States v. 37 Photographs, 402 U.S.
363 (1971); welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411
(1969); Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967); Ker v. Califoria, 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Glidden
Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962); Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961); Green v.
United States, 365 U.S. 301 (1961); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); United
States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953); United States v. John J. Felin & Co.,
334 U.S. 624 (1948).
Other cases that could perhaps be included in this category are the following: United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987); Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S.
670 (1982); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980); The
Mail Divisor Cases, 251 U.S. 326 (1920).
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Attorney General v Soto-Lopeze is an example. Soto-Lopez
involved an equal protection challenge to a New York state employ-
ment preference for those veterans who had entered the service from
New York. All justices presumably would have agreed that if the
right to travel did not require strict scrutiny (X) and if the statute
had a rational basis (Y), then the statute did not violate the equal
protection clause (r). Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Powell found that the right to travel required strict scrutiny, and
accordingly voted to invalidate the statute without reaching the
rational basis issue (not X and not reach Y).29 Chief Justice Burger,
on the other hand, found that the statute lacked a rational basis,
and voted to invalidate the statute without reaching the right to
travel/strict scrutiny issue (not reach X and not Y).30 If Justice
Brennan and his three colleagues had reached the rational basis issue
and decided that the statute had a rational basis (not X and Y),
and if Chief Justice Burger had reached the strict scrutiny issue and
decided that strict scrutiny was not appropriate (X and not Y), then
there would have been a separate majority for each of X and Y 31
By refraining from reaching an issue, each of these five justices
made what amounted to an implicit determination that it made no
difference if the issue were decided. The refusal to reach an issue in
these cases was thus a determination not to vote on the basis of
deference to a majority of justices who disagree on an issue. Another
seventeen cases fit within this class. 32
- 476 U.S. 898 (1986).
Attorney General v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 899-912 (1986). Justice Brennan
expressly refused to "run the laws [initially] through a rational-basis analysis." Id. at 906 n.6.
0Id. at 912-16 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger expressly refrained from
"adding dicta concerning the right to travel." Id. at 916.
Justice White concurred on the ground that the right to travel was not implicated, but
that the classification failed the rational basis test (X and not Y). Id. at 916. Thus with respect
to Justice White, this case is like Oakes.
3! Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, and Stevens dissented on the grounds that the right to
travel did not require strict scrutiny and that the statute was rationally based (X and Y). Soto-
Lopez, 476 U.S. at 924 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
3 See United States v. Kokmda, -U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990); Webster v.
Reproductive Health Serv., -...._U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie,
480 U.S. 39 (1987); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978);
Young v. Amencan Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583
(1974); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972);
Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); A
Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Manual Enter. v. Day, 370
U.S. 478 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953);
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123 (1951); United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951).
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Actually there are many more than seventeen such cases. Many
cases in which the reasoning of a concurrence is either broader or
narrower than that of the plurality are formally in this class of
cases. A "broader" concurrence is one based on a theory that would
result in more cases being decided in the direction of the respective
case than the theory of the plurality For instance, in Hoffman v
Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance,33 Justices White, Rehn-
quist, O'Connor, and Kennedy held that the Bankruptcy Code did
not abrogate a state's eleventh amendment immunity by clearly
authorizing a bankruptcy court to issue a money judgment against
a state that had not filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy
proceeding. Thus, states win these types of cases under the current
Bankruptcy Code. Justice Scalia, concurring and providing the fifth
vote for the state, held that Congress did not even have the power
to lift the state's immunity. Under his theory, states win these types
of cases under the current code and under any other code. In this
sense, his concurrence is "broader." Over fifty concurrences to
plurality decisions can be so characterized.3 In these cases one might
- U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2818 (1989).
34 See Walton v. Arizona, -U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 3047, .3058-68 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, .- U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2638, 2652-54 (1990) (Rehn-
quist, C.J., concurring); Board of Educ. v. Mergens, -U.S. - , 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2376-
78 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Chauffeurs, Local No. 391 v. Terry, -U.S.
110 S. Ct. 1339, 1349-53 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas,
U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 596, 611-14 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring); County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, -U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 3086, 3134-46 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring); Brendale
v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yaknia Indian Nation, -U.S. - , 109 S. Ct.
2994, 3018-26 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring); K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S.
281, 295-317 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 318-29 (Scalia, J., concumng); Kungys,
485 U.S. at 784-801 (Stevens, J., concurring); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 334-38 (1988)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Young, 481 U.S. at 815-25 (Scalia, J., concurrmng); Gray v.
Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 669-72 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468
U.S. 641, 692-704 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft,
462 U.S. 476, 505 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 509-13
(1983) (Brennan, J., concurring); Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 194-95 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320-32 (1981) (Stevens,
J., concurring); Fullilove v. Klutzmck, 448 U.S. 448, 517-21 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurrng);
Richmond Newspaper, Inc. v. Virgia, 448 U.S. 555, 584-98 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring);
Walter, 447 U.S. at 660-62 (White, J., concurring); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433-
42 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring); United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 477 (1980) (Powell,
J., concurring); New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 547-
51 (1979) (Blackmnun, J., concurring); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 643-44 (1978) (Marshall,
J., concurring); Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 547-49 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 600-01 (Marshall,
J., concurrmng); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977) (White and Rehnquist, JJ.,
concurring); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 336 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at
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assume that the justices concurring on a broader ground, if they
were to assume for the moment that the broader reasoning was m
error, would naturally adopt the narrower ground adopted by their
colleagues in the plurality, leading to the same result. If so, there is
no way in which deference to a majority of the Court could lead to
a different vote. Stated differently, these cases arguably are not ones
in which there is the opportunity for the "broader" reasoning
justices to vote against themselves, since even if they deferred to the
rejection of the broader reasoning, they would certainly accept the
narrower a fortiori, and vote m the same manner anyway
The trouble with this last analysis is that acceptance of a broader
ground does not necessarily require acdeptance of the narrower.35 In
336-37 (Marshall, J., concurring); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305-06 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 306 (Marshall, J., concurring); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262,
277-79 (1976) (White, J., concurring); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 260-61 (1976) (White,
J., concurring); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 207-26 (1976) (White, J., concurring); Roemer
v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 767-70 (1976) (White, J., concurrng); Codispoti v.
Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 518-22 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring); United States v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 545-72 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring); Tilton v. Richardson,
403 U.S. 672, 661-71 (1971) (White, J., concurring); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,
557 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 491 n.* (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 57 (1971) (Black, J., concurring);
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 135-52 (1970) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 152-229
(Harlan, J., concurring); id. at 229-81 (Brennan, J., concurring); Baldwin v. New York, 399
U.S. 66, 74-76 (1970) (Black, J., concurring); Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130, 170-
72 (1967) (Black, J., concurring) (this case was heard together with another and is titled as
Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts.); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380-84 (1966) (Harlan, J.,
concumng); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
General, 383 U.S. 413, 421 (1966) (Black, J., concurring); Local Umon No. 189, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of America v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 697-735 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196-97 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 146-48 (1953) (Minton, J., concurring); Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 56-57 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338
U.S. 62, 66-67 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring); Hams v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 71-
73 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring); Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 80 (1949) (Black,
J., concurring); Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 96-99 (1948) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring); Newark Fire Ins. Co. v. New Jersey Bd. of Tax Appeals, 307 U.S. 313, 323-24
(1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Other cases in this category may include Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
294-95 (1986) (White, J., concurring), and Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1047-51 (1983)
(Powell, J., concurring).
11 Tis can be stated more formally as follows. Assume (X and Y) imply not-r, and
(not-X or not-Y) imply r. Three justices hold not-X and three hold not-Y, resulting in a court
holding of r. Not-X is "broader" than not-Y if not-X requires (or implies) not-Y. For instance,
"there is never jurisdiction under statute A" is broader than "there is no jurisdiction under
statute A on these facts" since "there is never jurisdiction" requires the conclusion that "there
is no jurisdiction on these facts." But just because a justice accepts not-X and therefore not-
Y, does not mean that the same justice cannot logically reason, but if X, then Y. For example,
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McKeiver v Pennsylvana,6 a four-justice plurality held that the
sixth amendment did not guarantee the right to a jury trial in state
juvenile proceedings. Justices Harlan and Brennan concurred sepa-
rately Although Justice Harlan's concurrence was based on the
broader ground that the sixth amendment did not extend the right
to a jury trial to states, he did express the view that if the sixth
amendment applied to the states, then he "would have great diffi-
culty" holding that the right was not guaranteed m juvenile pro-
ceedings. 37 Similarly, mn Gosa v Mayden,5 a four-justice plurality
held that the rule of O'Callahan v Parker9 (that crimes tried by
military court martial must be service-connected) did not apply
retroactively. Justice Rehnqust concurred on the broader ground
that O'Callahan was wrongly decided and should be overruled. 40
However, Justice Rehnqust also determined that O'Callahan should
be applied retroactively if it were to be applied at all.41 In these
cases as well as m those cases where the broader concurrence ex-
presses no opinion on the narrower issue, the more or less direct
Inference is that the justice had the opportunity to defer to a
majority of his or her colleagues on the broader issue, and in
refraining from even reaching the narrower issue implicitly held that
it would make no difference to do so. Otherwise, the concurring
justice's analysis is incomplete. Accordingly, these cases must be
included among those m which justices have determined that it
would not be appropriate to vote against their own position.
For the purposes of the present analysis, we should also include
those cases n which the concurrence is narrower. A "narrower"
holding is one based on a theory that would result m fewer cases
being decided similarly to the respective case than the theory em-
ployed by the plurality In Thompson v Oklahoma,42 Justices Stev-
"there is never jurisdiction under this statute," but "if there is ever jurisdiction under this
statute, then there is jurisdiction on these facts." In other words, one can consistently hold
(1) not-X, (2) r, (3) not-Y, (4) but if X, then Y and not-r. Of course the same reasoner could
also consistently decide (4) differently-if X, not Y. For example, "even if there is ever
jurisdiction under the statute, there is no jurisdiction on these facts." Thus the fact that not-
X implies not-Y does not resolve the issue of Y if the justice is willing to defer to disagreeing
justices on the issue of X.
mMcKever, 403 U.S. at 528.
Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Gosa, 413 U.S. at 665.
- 395 U.S. 258 (1969), overruled by Solono v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
,0 Gosa, 413 U.S. at 692 (Rehaquist, J., concurring).
"Id. Justice Black's concurrence m James, 366 U.S. at 223-25, is sunilar.
" 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
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ens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun held that capital punishment
could not be applied for a crime committed while the defendant was
under 16 years old.43 Justice O'Connor provided the necessary fifth
vote to vacate the death sentence, but she based her decision on the
narrower ground that defendants who were below age 16 at the time
of the offense may not be executed under authority of a state statute
that specifies no nummum age at which the commission of a crime
can lead to execution. 4 Another fifty cases fit this pattern of plu-
rality decision plus a narrower concurrence. 45 They are really no
- Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 818-38 (1988).
" Id. at 857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
4 See Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, ..... U.S. -, 110 S.
Ct. 2281, 2293-96 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring); Brendale, 109 S. Ct. at 3015-17 (Stevens,
J., concurring); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, - U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1795-96
(1989) (White, J., concurring); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, . U.S. , 109 S. Ct.
890, 905-07 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Florida v. Riley, -U.S. -, 109 S. Ct.
693, 697-99 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 183-88
(1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring); EEOC v. Commercial Office Prod. Co., 486 U.S. 107,
125-26 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring); City of St. Lous v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 132-
47 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring); Welch v. State Dept. of Highways, 483 U.S. 468, 495-96
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 399-403 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); Asai Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 116-21
(1987) (Brennan, J., concurring); California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272,
292-95 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring); FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238,
265-66 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v.
EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 483-89 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477
U.S. 561, 581-86 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 418-27
(1986) (Powell, J., concurring); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341-43 (1985) (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring); Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 573-74 (1984) (Powell, J.,
concurring); South Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367, 382-84 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring);
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 958-74 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730, 747-51 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 89-92 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); California
Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 201-04 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring); NLRB v.
Retail Store Employees Union, 447 U.S. 607, 616-18 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring); id.
at 618-19 (Stevens, J., concurring); Vitek y. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 497-500 (1980) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 755-62 (Powell, J., concurring); Houchins v. KQED,
Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16-19 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring); Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437
U.S. 655, 667-68 (1978) (Blacknun, J., concurring); Coker, 433 U.S. at 601-04 (Powell, J.,
concurring); Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 603-05 (1976) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121-22 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); Elrod
v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 374-75 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring); United States v. MacCollom,
426 U.S. 317, 329-30 (1976) (BIackmun, J., concurring); United States v. Mandujano, 425
U.S. 564, 584-609 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 609 (Stewart, J., concurring);
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 491-95 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 691 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 691-92 (Powell, J.,
concurring); Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 505-07 (1972) (White, J., concumng); Rosenbloom,
403 U.S. at 57-62 (White, J., concurring); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 548-54 (1968)
(White, J., concurring); In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646-47 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring);
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different from the cases m which the concurrence is broader, except
in the relative number of justices to take the. broader or narrower
position. Regardless of whether the justices employing broader rea-
soning are in the plurality or the concurrence, their failure to assume
arguendo that they are wrong on the broader issue rejected by a
majority implies the irrelevance of such an inquiry
There are occasional examples, however, where a concurring
justice-whose vote is needed to determine the case 6 proceeds to
decide an issue on the hypothetical assumption that he or she
wrongly determined the broader issue.47 A justice will reach an issue
that need not be reached under his or her own analysis and justify
examination of the issue on the ground that the other justices
disagree on the issue. But generally this has occurred only when the
justice's resolution of the second issue leads to the same result as
analysis of the first issue. Reaching the second issue in this situation
amounts to no more than a decision on alternative grounds. For
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 41-64 (1957) (Frankfurter, 3., concurring); id. at 65-78 (Harlan,
J., concurring); Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 68-73 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring);
United States v. Pewee Coal Co., 341 U.S. 114, 119-21 (1951) (Reed, J., concurring); Interstate
Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662, 668-69 (1949) (Burton, J., concurring); Klapprott
v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 616 (1949) (Burton, 3., concurring); Colegrove v. Green, 328
U.S. 549, 564-66 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572,
586-90 (1946) (Stone, C.J., concurring); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Leatherwood, 250 U.S. 478,
482-83 (1919) (McReynolds, J., concurring); Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U.S. 434, 441-46 (1914)
(McKenna, 3., concurring); Mayor v. Ray, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 468, 481-85 (1873) (Hunt, J.,
concurring).
" There are some cases where a dispositive number of justices decided that the court
had jurisdiction and reached the merits in a certain way, and an extra justice, while finding
no jurisdiction, nonetheless reached the merits. See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S.
204, 218 n.3 (1970) (Stewart, 3., dissenting); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1966)
("separate opinon" of Harlan, J.); Kesler v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 174 (1962)
(Stewart, 3., concurring in part); id. at 175-82 (Warren, C.J., dissenting); Flonda Lime &
Avocado Growers v. Jacobsen, 362 U.S. 73, 86 (1960) (Douglas, 3., dissenting). In each of
these instances the particular justice's vote could not affect the outcome, and it therefore
mattered little how he voted or whether his separate opinion was called a "concurrence," a
"dissent," or neither. See also Konigsberg, 353 U.S. at 276-312 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(rejecting majority finding of jurisdiction and further proceeding to reject majority decision
on the merits).
In a somewhat analogous situation, in Regan, 465 U.S. at 370-81, Justice Stevens joined
part of what otherwise would have been entirely a plurality opinion, thus rendering that part
an "opinion of the Court," but he clearly dissented because he disagreed with the second step
of the plurality's reasoning. Id. at 403-19 (Stevens, 3., dissenting). Justice Blackmun had
concurred on a ground narrower than that of the plurality, id. at 382-84, making Justice
Stevens's vote not necessary for the result.
47 See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711,
731 (1987) (O'Connor, 3., concurring); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 574 (1979) (Rehnqust,
3., concurring); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 619 (1978) (Marshall, 3., concurring).
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instance, United States v Jorn4l involved a criminal mistrial and
subsequent dismissal of the information on retrial, on double jeopardy
grounds. On direct appeal, reversal was appropriate only if (X) the
decision was appealable under the Criminal Appeals Act and (Y)
retrial would not violate the double jeopardy clause. Justices Harlan,
Burger, Douglas, and Marshall held that the decision was appealable,
but that retrial violated the double jeopardy clause (X but not Y). 49
Justices Black and Brennan stated that the Court lacked jurisdiction;
"[h]owever, in view of the decision by a majority of the Court to
reach the merits, they jom[ed] the judgment of the Court." (Not X
and not Y.) Justices Black and Brennan deferred to the majority
with respect to the preliminary issue of jurisdiction, but reached the
same result they would have reached if they had not done so.
Such cases may not involve rejection of the idea that a justice
will defer to a majority of disagreeing colleagues on an issue, but
the cases certainly do not reflect an acceptance of that idea.
D. Cases Containing Shifting Majorities
If there is precedent for deference to the majority, it would
most likely occur in a case involving a plurality opinion, like
Pennsylvania v Union Gas. It is also conceivable that such a result
can occur in a case in which a majority opinion has different
majorities supporting each of two parts of the opinion. Such an
opinion is not a plurality opinion, and can be called a"shifting
majority" opinion. A case with a "shifting majority" opinion, in
which both X and Y are required for r, might conceivably look
like the following:
Majority opinion by A. Part I holding X joined by Justices A, B,
C,D&E
Part II holding Y joined by Justices A, B,
C,F&G
Therefore r.
Concurrence by F & G: "although we disagree with X, we join the
majority opinion to establish Y and con-
cur in r"
Concurrence by D & E: "although we disagree with Y, we join the
majority opinion to establish X and con-
cur in r"
- 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
41 United States v. Jon, 400 U.S. 470, 472-87 (1971).
"Id. at 488.
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Dissent by H & I: We reject X and Y and dissent.
In this hypothetical, even though fewer than 5 justices decide both
X and Y, the deference to disagreeing majorities implicit in the
concurrences results in r, but there is no plurality opinion.
An examination of the shifting majority decisions of the Su-
preme Court, however, turns up only one such concurrence, to be
discussed at a later point.51 Instead, shifting majority opinions
generally arise in two types of cases. The first is when there are
really two cases before the Court, in the sense that two distinct
remedies are sought.52 For instance, Whitcomb v Chav&S13 involved
two distinct challenges to Indiana's state legislative apportionment.
One dealt with whether Marion County should be divided into
single-member districts, while the' other dealt with whether the
entire state had to be reapportioned because of large population-
per-senator variations. Justices Burger, Black, Blackmun, and Ste-
wart joined Justice White's majority opinion holding that Marion
County could remain a multi-member district. Justices Douglas,
Brennan, and Marshall, but not Stewart, joined Justices White,
Burger, Black and Blackmun in holding that state-wide reappor-
tionment was required. Here two different claims existed rather
than two steps in the resolution of one claim, and no justice voted
on the premise that he was wrong.
The second type of shifting majority opinion involves a two-
step analysis in which one step is not necessary to the Court's
conclusion.54 Stated formally, where X and Y are required for r,
one majority finds X and another majority finds not Y The
11 See infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text (discussing Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 62).
Georgia v. South Carolina, -U.S. -, 110 S. Ct. 2903 (1990) (different portions
of boundary dispute); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (claim
and cross-claim); Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978)
(prospective and retroactive relief); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (challenges to different
statutory provisions); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971) (redistricting of one county
and reapportionment of entire state); see also Hodgson v. Minnesota, - U.S. - , 110
S. Ct. 2926 (1990) (different provisions of abortion statute); Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe
Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800 (1973) (remand to agency and court injunction
pending resolution of remand); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (different crumnal
defendants).
S3 403 U.S. at 124.
- See, Penry v. Lynaugh, -U.S. - , 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989); Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511 (1985); Rose, 443 U.S. at 545; United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973);
United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Corp., 411 U.S. 655 (1973); Gilbert v. California,
388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Allen v. Regents of the
Univ. Sys. of Georgia, 304 U.S. 439 (1938).
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holding of the shifting majority is therefore not-r. For instance, in
Allen v Regents of the University System of Georga,55 Justice
Roberts delivered the shifting majority opinion. If there were ju-
risdiction to challenge a particular tax (X), and the tax were un-
constitutional (Y), an injunction would issue to stop collection of
the tax (r). Justices Butler and McReynolds joined Justices Roberts,
Brandeis, and Hughes in finding jurisdiction (X). Justices Stone
and Reed joined Justices Roberts, Brandeis, and Hughes in holding
that the tax was valid (not-Y). Justice Black held that the Court
did not have jurisdiction (not-X), but apparentiy found the tax to
be constitutional (Y), and therefore concurred in the judgment (not
r). Only Justices Butler and McReynolds found that there was
jurisdiction and that the tax was invalid (X & Y imply r). There
was no occasion in this situation for any of the concurring justices
to defer to a majority on one of the issues and vote against himself,
and thereby change the result. If Justices Stone and Reed had
assumed jurisdiction because a majority found it even though they
rejected it, they still would have voted against the injunction on
the grounds that the tax was constitutional. If Justice Black had
assumed jurisdiction, he could have dissented on the ground that
the tax was invalid (he did not do so), but it only would have
increased the number of dissenters to three and would not have
changed the result of the case. This class of cases largely fails to
disclose any precedent for a justice's deference to a disagreeing
majority 56
" 304 U.S. at 439.
Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982), is a shifting majority decision that falls in
neither category, but which nonetheless provides no precedent for voting against one's own
position. In Edgar, if (X) the case was not moot and (Y) the Illinois statute was unconstitu-
tional, then (r) the lower court's injunction against enforcement of the statute would be
affirmed. Justice Blackmun joined Justices White, Burger, Stevens, and O'Connor in the
opinion of the Court, which held (X) the case was not moot. Id. at 630. Justices White,
Burger, Stevens, O'Connor, and Powell joined the opinion of the Court holding that the
Illinois statute violated the commerce clause. Id. at 643-47. But Justice Powell did not concur
in the judgment of the Court affirming the injunction. Id. at 646. The judgment of affirmance
resulted only because Justice Blackmun, while disagreeing on the commerce clause issue, found
(also Y) that the statute violated the supremacy clause. Id. at 634-40 (plurality opinion). Justice
Powell's vote in Edgar thus is precisely analogous to Justice Stevens' vote m South Carolina
v. Regan. See supra note 46. See also Munz, 110 S. Ct. at 2644-49, which appears to be
analogous to Edgar.
There are instances in which a justice provided a fifth vote for a majority opinion by
writing a separate concurrence reflecting the justice's desire to create a majority. See United
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 354 (1974) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street,
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II. DisTwGUISHABLE PRECEDENTS
As discussed above, over 150 Supreme Court cases involving
plurality majority opimons indicate that a justice should not defer
to a majority that disagrees on a dispositive issue. 57 In contrast,
justices in six cases prior to Union Gas have voted contrary to
their own analysis. As will be shown, however, five of these cases
could not have been decided any other way. The remaimng case is
an unwise anomaly. Thus, they serve as little precedent for such a
practice.
A. The Triple Choice Cases
In five of these cases the Supreme Court had three possible
choices. In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing5 representatives of
victims of a towboat accident brought suit against liability insurers
under a Louisiana direct action statute. The court of appeals held
that the suit was not foreclosed by the federal Limited Liability
Act. Justices Frankfurter, Reed, Jackson, and Burton reasoned
that the federal act required dismissal of the state claims alto-
gether.59 Justices Black, Warren, Douglas, and Minton held that
the federal act did not impair the state law 6 Justice Clark, how-
ever, rejected both of these results, finding that the federal act
required the district court to delay consideration of the state law
367 U.S. 740, 778-79 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring). Although these instances may be
troubling, see Kelman, The Forked Path of Dissent, 1985 Sup. Cr. R v. 227, 267-28, they
are distinguishable m a significant way from votes like Justice White's in Union Gas. The
concurring justice in these cases actually joined the opinion of the Court, for whatever reason,
and thus voted upon a rationale that he accepted. That is presumably what is meant by
"joining an opinion."
See supra notes 9, 27, 32, 34, 45 and accompanying text.
Professor Leonard performed a similar examination of the lugh court cases of four
states. See Leonard, The Correctness Function of Appellate Decson-Making: Judicial Obli-
gation in an Era of Fragmentation, 17 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 299, 339 & n.203 (1984). Two
Indiana Supreme Court cases in which there were votes analogous to Justice White's vote in
Union Gas sparked Professor Leonard's inquiry. Id. at 317-25 (describing Bryan v. State, 438
N.E.2d 709 (Ind. 1982), and Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Stock, 403 N.E.2d 1077 (Ind.
1980)). Professor Leonard looked at criminal cases in the high courts of California, New
York, Alabama, and Indiana during the period 1973 to 1983, and found no precedent for
voting against one's position.
In an examination of the ethical implications of "paradoxical voting," Aunee Imundo
noted the difficulty of determining how rare such voting behavior has been. Imundo, Para-
doxical Voting in the Supreme Court, 3 GEo. J. op LoAL ET mcs 867, 883 (1990).
- 347 U.S. 409 (1954).
" Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 422 (1954) (plurality opinion).
- Id. at 432-38 (Black, J., dissenting).
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claim until the limitation proceeding under the federal act was
concluded. 61 Justice Frankfurter's plurality opinion stated that he
would reverse the court of appeals and reinstate the district court
dismissal of the complaints, but
[i]n order to break the deadlock resulting from the differences of
opinion within the Court and to enable a majority to dispose of tis
litigation, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
order the case to be remanded to the District Court to be continued
until after the completion of the limitation proceeding 2
Unless one of the three voting groups voted against its own position,
there would be no judgment from the Court. A different majority
rejected each of the three possible conclusions. At least one group
had to vote against its own position. In these situations it makes sense
for the "mddle" position to obtain, and that is the result of the
Frankfurter group's vote. If the Black group had done the same thing
to avoid a deadlock, then the same result (remand) would have
occurred. And if Justice Clark had changed his vote just to avoid a
deadlock, an anomaly would have resulted. For instance, if Justice
Clark had voted to dismiss altogether, but voted his own views m the
future, then a subsequent case in which the limitation proceeding had
been concluded could permit the state proceeding, thus permitting the
inconsistent result of federal preemption in one case but not another
on identical facts. Consistency supports the way in which the deadlock
was resolved.
Three very similar cases involving the mutually exclusive triple
choice of whether to affirm, remand, or reverse occurred m the decade
prior to Maryland Casualty6a The fifth and most recent triple-choice
61 Id. at 423-27.
Id. at 423 (plurality opinon).
See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 619 (1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring);
Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 726-27 (1948) (plurality opinion); Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 134 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
In the last case Justice Rutledge stated:
If each member accords his vote to his belief, the case cannot have disposition.
Stalemate should not prevail for any reason, however compelling, in a criminal
cause or, if avoidable, in any other. My views concerning appropriate disposition
are more nearly in accord with [remand than with] outright reversal. Accordingly,
in order that disposition may be made of tns case, my vote has been cast to
[remand].
Id.
See also Inman v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry., 361 U.S. 138, 141 (1959) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring), in which Justice Frankfurter provided the fifth vote for affirmance, instead of
his preference for disnssal of certiorari as improvidently granted, so that affirmance would
not be based on an unexplained 4-4 decision. (Note that the result for the respondent would
have been the same in either case).
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case is Connecticut v Johnson.64 The Connecticut Supreme Court
reversed a criminal conviction on federal due process grounds. Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, White, and Marshall agreed that there was a
due process violation and voted to affirmn. Justice Stevens reasoned
that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to review the state court's
action. 6 Justices Powell, Burger, Rehnquist, and O'Connor found
jurisdiction but no due process violation.6 Justice Stevens voted along
with the Blackmun group although his reasoning would have lead to
dismissal of the writ of certiorari rather than affirmance: "Because a
fifth vote is necessary to authorize the entry of a Court judgment,
however, I join the disposition which will allow the judgment of the
Connecticut Supreme Court to stand."
These five cases represent the exception that demonstrates the
rule. The justices voting against their own position expressly justified
their actions as necessary for the Court to issue a judgment. By
negative implication, the only principle that will trump the uniform
practice of Supreme Court justices' voting consistently with their own
reasoning is the fundamental rule that a court must decide the case
before it.
B. The Remaining Case-A Shifting Majority
The remaining case is the shifting majority decision m United
States v. Vuitch.69 The issue was whether the District of Columbia
could prosecute a doctor under an abortion statute. The district court
dismissed the indictment on the grounds that the D.C. statute was
unconstitutionally vague, and the government appealed directly to the
Supreme Court under a federal statute permitting direct appeals when
federal statutes are held unconstitutional. All of the justices presum-
ably would have agreed that if (X) the Supreme Court had jurisdiction
despite the fact that the challenged federal statute applied only to the
District of Columbia, and (Y) the statute could be constitutionally
applied to defendant, then (r) the dismissal of the indictment should
be reversed. Justice Black's two-part shifting majority opinion was
joined in its entirety by Chief Justice Burger and Justice White. Justice
Black held that the Court had jurisdiction and that the statute could
- 460 U.S. 73 (1983).
Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 74-88 (1983) (plurality opmion).
6Id. at 88-90 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 90-102 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Id. at 89-90 (Stevens, J., concurring).
402 U.S. 62 (1971).
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be constitutionally applied (X and Y therefore r.) Justices Douglas
and Stewart joined Justice Black's opinion to hold that the Court
had jurisdiction,70 but for different reasons found that the statute
could not constitutionally be applied to the actions of the defendant, 71
and therefore dissented (X but not-Y therefore not-r). Justices Harlan,
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun found that the Supreme Court
lacked jurisdiction (not-X).72 If these justices believed the Court lacked
jurisdiction it follows that they should not have voted to reverse, and
that is indeed how Justices Brennan and Marshall voted (not-X implies
not-r without deciding Y). Justices Blackmun and Harlan, however,
joined Justice Black's opinion with regard to the constitutionality of
the abortion statute, and voted to reverse, despite their opinion that
the Court lacked jurisdiction (not-X and Y imply not-r but vote r
anyway). Justice Harlan did so "substantially for the reasons set forth
in . Justice Blackmun's separate opinion," 73 which in turn stated:
Although I join Mr. Justice Harlan m his conclusion that this
case is not properly here by direct appeal under 18 U.S.C. 3731,
a majority, and thus the Court, holds otherwise. The case is
therefore here and requires decision.
The five Justices constituting the majority, however, are di-
vided on the merits. [He described each position.]
Because of the inability of the jurisdictional-issue majority to
agree upon the disposition of the case, I feel obligated not to
remain silent as to the merits. [He cited four cases.] Assuming, as
I must m the light of the Court's decision, that the Court does
have jurisdiction of the appeal, I join Part II of Mr. Justice Black's
opinion and the judgment of the Court.74
Thus, although a majority of the justices did not believe that the
Court could legally reinstate Vuitch's indictment, the indictment was
nonetheless reinstated.
The cases cited by Justice Blackmun were all distinguishable.
One was a triple-choice case where such a vote was necessary to
decide the case.7 One was essentially a decision on alternate grounds.7 6
70 United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 63 n.* (1971).
71 Id. at 74-80 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 96-97 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
7 Id. at 81-96 (Harlan, J., concurring).
71 Id. at 96 (Harlan, J., "dissenting as to jurisdiction").
71 Id. at 97-98 (opinion of Blackmun, J.).
7, Screws, 325 U.S. at 134 (Rutledge, J., concurring); see supra note 63 and accompa-
nying text.
71 United States v. Join, 400 U.S. 470, 487-88 (1971) (statement of Black and Brennan,
JJ.); see supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
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The other two were cases in which the justice's vote was unclear
and made no difference in the outcome.7 Thus, Justice Blackmun's
action was largely unprecedented.
III. THE ALLEGED JUSTICATIONS
A. Analogy to Stare Decisis
The votes of Justices Harlan and Blackmun in Vuitch, supported
by simple ipse dixit, are pretty meager authority compared to the
overwhelming precedent against what Justice White did m Union
Gas. Nonetheless, his action has a certain plausibility to it. It seems
analogous to the rule of stare decisis. If the majority has decided,
then one should follow the majority's analysis for the same reasons
that justify stare decisis. This approach, however, does not bear
careful examination.
None of the policies underlying stare decisis supports deference
to a majority in the same case. The primary justification for stare
decisis is the predictability that is gamed by conforming to prece-
dent. 71 Those who are affected by law should be able to ascertain it
and rely upon it. If -a court decides a case a certain way, persons
affected by the law involved should be able to anticipate that an
indistinguishable fact situation will be decided m the same way
However, there- is no way that anyone can have relied upon a
majority's resolution of an issue in the very case that is being
decided. The reliance justification for stare decisis does not support
deference to a disagreeing majority in the same case.
Reliance interests do not totally explain the doctrine of stare
decisis, however. Over the years, courts have developed rules dic-
tating when stare decisis should or should not apply 79 For instance,
courts more easily overrule precedent that is itself inconsistent with
previous precedent,80 and precedent that is unworkable." The Su-
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 222-23 (1966) (separate opinon of Harlan, J.);
Kesler v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 369 U.S. 153, 174, 179 (1962) (Stewart, J., concurrmng m part,
and Warren, C.J., dissenting); see supra note 46.
71 R. WAssHErRom, THE JurDciAL DECION: TowAIM A THEoRY op LEGAL. JUSTIFICATION
60-69 (1961); Maltz, Judicial Precedent, 66 N.C.L. REv. 367, 368-69 (1988); Schauer, Prece-
dent, 39 STAN. L. REv. 571, 597-98 (1987).
79 See Comment, Constitutional Stare Decas, 103 HARv. L. Ry. 1344, 1346-47 (1990).
01 E.g., Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241 (1970);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941).
11 E.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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preme Court has held that stare decisis applies more strictly in
statutory than in constitutional cases.8 2 Such meta-principles regard-
ing when to apply stare decisis can be ascertained by lawyers as
readily as the primary legal rules . 3 Expectation or reliance interests
underlying stare decisis can thereby be reconciled with what is fre-
quently the refusal of modem courts to follow precedent. Lawyers,
in other words, can advise clients as to the likelihood that their cases
will be decided in the same way as previous cases. For this reason,
reliance interests do not entirely explain the doctrine of stare de-
cisisA4 It is also difficult to use reliance as a basis for asking a court
to rely upon an obscure case that a lawyer through diligent effort
has managed to dig up to support the client's position. There is no
way that the client can have relied upon the case, yet few would
doubt the relevance of the case for that reason.
The more fundamental policy supporting stare decisis is that it
is intrinsically fairer for like cases to be decided in a like manner. 85
Consistency is embedded in our very idea of what is "law " Only
a distinguishing fact that somehow justifies a different result, or a
conclusion that the previous case was clearly wrong, justifies decid-
Ing a case differently from precedent. Otherwise we. will have a
government of "men and not law " Judges will differ on what
distinctions are significant, and on how clearly a precedent must be
wrong to be overruled (though meta-principles can develop on these
issues), but the underlying premise that like cases should be decided
in a like manner remams. In the case of a justice's consideration of
whether to defer to a disagreeing majority in the same case, however,
there is no "other" case with which to be consistent. Thus, neither
of the most important policies supporting stare decisis can be used
to justify such deference.
82 E.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977); see Maltz, supra note
78, at 388-93; Comment, supra note 79, at 1344 (doctrine of stare decisis least predictable m
area of constitutional law). This meta-rule has been criticized recently. See Easterbrook,
Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CoiNas L. Rav. 422 (1988); Eskridge,
Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEo. L.J. 1361 (1988).
83 Professor Kelman analyzed in detail the extent to which individual justices have felt
bound by pior holdings to which they dissented. Kelman, The Forked Path of Dissent, 1985
Sup. CT. REv. 227. He found no "pat formula" to explain the varying actions of the justices
in this regard, and suggested guidelines in order to reconcile the competing policies of (1)
settling the law and (2) abiding by one's convictions. Id. at 297-98.
"4 The circularity of reasoning itivolved in using reliance as a justification for stare
decisis has been shown in other ways, See R. WAssnnsmoM, supra note 68, at 76-79.
11 R. WAssEpsmom, supra note 78, at 69-72; Kornhauser and Sager, Unpacking the
Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 104 (1986); Maltz, supra note 78, at 369-70; Schauer, supra note 78,
at 595-97.
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Other policies supporting stare decisis are similarly not furthered
by deference m the instant case. One argument for reliance on
precedent is the judicial efficiency derived from courts not having
to reevaluate a previously considered legal issue.8 6 There is no com-
parable efficiency gamed from deferring to a majority m a case
currently under consideration. Just as much analysis is required to
determne that the justice disagrees in the first place!
Finally, stare decisis can be justified on the ground that the
collective wisdom of courts over the years should generally supersede
the relatively limited insights of a court hearing a single case at a
precise point in time.87 This argument by its nature has no applica-
bility to the possibility of deference to judges deciding the same case
at the same point m time. None of the justifications for stare decisis
supports voting as Justice White did in Union Gas.
B. Coherence and Consistency
Even though the rationales for stare decisis do not support
Justice White's deference, there are other possible justifications that
should be explored. Some would maintain that such voting improves
the coherence of the law. An ephemeral improvement in coherence,
however, comes at the cost of a mortal wound to consistency The
problem of mcoherence can be shown by again considering the
anomalous nature of cases like Wyman-Gordon, in which the effec-
tive holding of the multi-member Court as a whole reflects the views
of none of the justices. The incoherent result of the anomaly is
made clearer by comparing the result in Wyman-Gordon with the
results of two hypothetical cases decided the next day, "Wyman-
Gordon IP' and "Wyman-Gordon Iff." Recall that in Wyman-
Gordon the NLRB required an employer to provide a list of the
names and addresses of its employees to unions seeking to organize
the employees. The Board based its action on an earlier decision,
Excelsior, that had enunciated a general requirement that employers
furnish employment lists to unions. The two premises required for
reversing the NLRB were roughly (X) the Excelsior "rule" was
improperly promulgated under the Administrative Procedure Act,
and (Y) if Excelsior were improperly promulgated, the agency de-
" Maltz, supra note 78, at 370-71; Schauer, supra note 78, at 599; Wasserstrom, supra
note 78, at 72-73; Flonda Dep't of Health v. Flonda Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147,
154 & n.12 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
SFlorida Dep't of Health, 450 U.S. at 154 & n.12 (Stevens, J., concurrng); R.
WAssmxsx-om, supra note 78, at 75-79; Maltz, supra note 78, at 371-72.
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cision must be reversed even if the agency could have made the
same requirement without relying on Excelsior Justices Douglas and
Harlan voted that X and. Y together required reversal of the agency
action, but they lost because Justice Black and two others rejected
X, while Justice Fortas and three others rejected Y. Assume that m
"Wyman-Gordon IF' an Excelsior-like "rule" came about m a way
that every Justice could agree that it was improperly promulgated,
but that the circumstances regarding subsequent application were
indistinguishable from Wyman-Gordon. Now Justices Black's group
plus Justices Douglas and Harlan would have voted to reverse the
agency, but presumably Justice Fortas's group would dissent.
Now assume that in "Wyman-Gordon IIP' the Excelsior "rule"
came about exactly as in Wyman-Gordon but that the agency could
not have taken the subsequent action without reliance on the pre-
vious "rule," so that all of the Justices now agree that if the previous
"rule" were improperly promulgated, then reversal of the agency is
required. Justice Fortas's group would now join Justices Douglas
and Harlan to reverse the agency, while Justice Black's group would
dissent. The anomaly is that no justice would find that all three
cases were correctly resolved. No consistently applied logical theory
can justify all three results.
Tis anomaly is closely related to the possibility of "cycling"
identified by Professor '(now Judge) Frank Easterbrook as an ex-
ample designed to prove the impossibility of consistent decisionmak-
mg by multiple-member courts.88 Easterbrook relied on Arrow's
Theorem, which demonstrates that given certain natural assump-
tions, consistency on the part of individual members of a multiple-
member decisionmaking body precludes consistency on the part of
the body as a whole. Easterbrook's example hypothesized one group
of judges that reads the first amendment to forbid all aid to religion
(the absolute or "A" position), a second group that permits such
aid if it is neutral between religious and nonreligious associations
(the neutral or "N" position), and a third group of judges that
believes that the first amendment requires a balancing of factors to
determine whether neutral aid to religion is permitted (the balancing
or "B" position). The example further supposes that the A group
as a second choice would prefer N over B, the N group would
prefer B over A, and the B group would prefer A over N. Under
these circumstances no one of the three rules can be consistently
" Easterbrook, Ways of Criticzing the Court, 95 HARv. L. REv. 802, 814-17 (1982).
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chosen m successive cases, at least when successive lawyers on either
side argue just one of the three positions. When these opimons are
considered together, the effective holding is one that no individual
justice would support.
The possibility that this situation may exist led Easterbrook to
the conclusion that "[a] demand for consistency as a rule asks
the impossible of the [Supreme] Court." Easterbrook supported
this conclusion with an application of Kenneth Arrow's Nobel Prize-
winning theorem to judicial decisionmaking. If a system of pooling
individuals' conclusions to produce a collective decision obeys four
conditions.that Easterbrook found inescapable m the case of multi-
member courts, 9° then the system cannot meet the condition of
"transitivity." There is "transitivity" when, "[i]f the collective de-
cision selects A over B and B over C, it also must select A over
C."'91 Easterbrook states flatly that without this transitivity, "con-
sistency is unpossible."' '
Tins is disheartening news for those who like to think about law
as consistent, and extra ammunition for those who tout the mdeter-
minacy of judicial determinations. Some people use this alleged
indeterminacy as a weapon to undermine the consensus of the
American polity about the limited role of courts in our constitutional
system. 3 Put very simply, the idea is that courts are not really
" Id. at 823.
10 The four conditions that Easterbrook found "inescapable" are the following:
1. Unanimity: If all people entitled to a say in the decision prefer one option to another,
that option prevails.
2. Nondictatorshup: No one person's views can control the outcome in every case.
3. Range: The system must allow every ranking of admissible choices, and there must
be at least three admissible choices with no other institution to declare choices or rankings
out of bounds at the start.
4. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: The choice between options A and B depends
solely on the comparison of those two.
Id. at 823-30. Compare Spitzer, Multicriteria Choice Processes: An Application of Public
Choice Theory to Bakke, the FCC, and the Courts, 88 YALE L.J. 717, 758-64 (1979) (discussing
the inherent difficulty of determining the nature of choice processes used by courts).
'1 Easterbrook, supra note 88, at 830.
92 Id.
"See Chemermsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitu-
tional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TrEx. L. Rnv. 1207, 1239-48 (1984); Tushnet,
Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96
H.v. L. REv. 781 (1983); see also Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STA. L. REv. 765,
766-73 (1982); Miller, Toward a Definition of "The" Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. Ray.
633, 650-53 (1983). See generally Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAtiE. L. Rav. 283, 302 n.67
(1989) (for a collection of other examples); MeArthur, Abandoning the Constitution: The New
Wave in Constitutional Theory, 59 TiL. L. R-v. 280, 298-99 (1984) (for a summary of the
"nihilist" position).
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constrained by the "law," so why not accept that the judiciary is a
political entity much like the legislature or the executive. The asserted
inconsistency of multiple-member court decisionmakmg can be used
to support this argument because even if law is sufficiently deter-
inmate to distinguish courts from political branches when courts are
composed of single judges, that determinacy evaporates when there
is group judicial decisioninakmg. This is because where there is true
inconsistency, there is indeterminacy True inconsistency leads in-
exorably to indeterminacy, because if you can prove both X and
not-X (true inconsistency), then you can prove anything.9 So if
inconsistency is inevitable when we speak of multiple-member courts,
then we are forced to accept indeterminacy along with it.
But walt. Maybe judges can attain group consistency by sacn-
ficing individual consistency. Perhaps this is what Justice White was
attempting in Union Gas. To avoid Wyman-Gordon-like anomalies,
an individual justice could conceivably vote contrary to Ins or her
own legal analysis, under the guise of accepting the majority's
(incorrect) determination of that issue.
Indeed, avoiding group inconsistency might be an attractive basis
for voting against one's own conclusions, if one sees consistency as
a central goal. Easterbrook referred to the idea of voting against
one's own conclusions, to provide a "cure for the cycling of out-
comes," as "strategic voting." 95
Easterbrook did not advocate strategic voting, however, because
it does not solve the problem. There is no principled way to deter-
mine when to yield to other justices, "and if all the Justices engage
in strategic yielding, the result is the same as if none does." 96
Arrow's Theorem is too powerful, according to Easterbrook, and
regardless of strategic voting, judicial group decisionmaking always
reflects inconsistency. 97
While Easterbrook's analysis does not support Justice White's
action in Union Gas, his argument remains disturbing to those who
are unwilling to accept the wholesale indeterminacy of constitutional
law Easterbrook's use of Arrow's Theorem, however, has been
convincingly refuted by Professors Kornhauser and Sager. 9 They
1, For an engaging explanation of this, see R. SMuLrYAN, FoR VER UNDEcmED: A
PuzzIE GUIDE TO G6DEI. 57-58 (1987).
91 Easterbrook, supra note 88, at 821.
96 Id. at 822.
97 Id.
"Kornhauser and Sager, supra note 85.
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distinguish between consistency and coherence. 'While consistency is
"simply the state of noncontradiction," 99 coherence requires that a
system's premises "form or reflect a unitary vision of that portion
of the world modeled by the system. 'i"c It is simply wrong to say
that multi-member courts cannot decide as consistently as one-judge
courts. 01 The fact that the resulting overall rule may not make sense
does not mean that it is applied inconsistently Kornhauser and
Sager give a hypothetical example based on actual cases like Wyman-
Gordon.'i 2 If the Court deciding Wyman-Gordon and hypothetically
deciding Wyman-Gordon II and III were presented indistinguishable
facts in subsequent cases, then it would decide each case just as it
did the first time. 03 There is no special problem of like cases not
being decided in a like manner.
Easterbrook's error was in finding "transitivity" to be necessary
for consistency.' ° The rule that A will always be selected over B,
that B will always be selected over C, but that C will always be
selected over A, violates "transitivity" as the word is used by
Easterbrook,10 5 but such a rule can be consistently applied. The
courts need only resolve future choices between A and B, B and C,
and C and A, respectively in the same ways.i0 6
Kormhauser and Sager agree, however, that multi-member courts
cannot always be coherent. °7 The resulting overall rule, in other
9 Id. at 103.
' Id. at 105.
1o, Id. at 107-09.
"I Id. at 108-09.
,01 This statement assumes consistency on the part of the individual justices, but that
assumption is necessary also in order to find consistency on the part of one-judge courts.
,o, Easterbrook, supra note 88, at 830 ("Without transitivity, consistency is impossible").
101 Id. at 823.
-o Kornhauser and Sager also question Easterbrook's example:
Easterbrook's model treats the existence of more than two alternatives in a
somewhat odd way. While each judge has preferences over all alternatives, she
is presented choices pairwise. On Easterbrook's interpretation of alternatives as
rationales, such a restriction makes little sense. Judges simply are not asked in
case A to choose between rationales I and II, in case B between rationales II
and III, and in case C between rationales I and III. All of the rationales are
available to the judge in each case; in each instance, she is asked to choose the
best outcome.
Kornhauser and Sager, supra note 85, at 109 n.37; see also Revesz and Karlan, Nonmajority
Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1067, 1094 n.120 (1988). While Easter-
brook's particular example may suffer from this criticism, it is not too difficult to construct
a series of three decisions that as a group defy coherent explanation, such as the Wyman-
Gordon triptych described in the text.
'0 Kornhauser and Sager, supra note 85, at I11.
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words, does not reflect a unitary vision. It would perhaps be more
accurate to say that the rule is arbitrary, or not rationally related in
its entirety to sound policy The overall rule of the three Wyman-
Gordon cases represents such an incoherent rule. In fact, similar
incoherent rules can be extrapolated from any of the numerous cases
identified above in which justices who reasoned differently in con-
currences voted for the majority result.
The fact that multiple-member court decisionmaking is no less
consistent than that of one-judge courts relieves those of us who
oppose the indeterminacy attack on the traditional constitutional
role of our courts. But we are still left with the problem of inco-
herence. It is at least unseemly for group courts to come up with
rules that no individual judge would derive. Kornhauser and Sager
suggest no answer to this problem.Ies Justice White's almost unprec-
edented vote in Union Gas forces us to examine whether his action
is supported by the need to deal with incoherence.
First, one must understand that it is not difficult for lower
courts to apply "incoherent" law For instance, in First National
City Bank v Banco Nacional de Cuba'°9 a majority consisting of a
plurality of three justices and two single-justice concurrences con-
cluded that the act of state doctrine l0 did not apply to the case,
thus precluding a particular claim by Cuba against a New York
bank. Justice Rehnquist for the plurality found that a so-called
Bernstein letter' from the executive branch precluded application
of the act of state doctrine. Justice Douglas rejected the plurality's
reasoning but concurred on the ground that Cuba's claim was
brought as a counterclaim and setoff.112 Justice Powell rejected both
the plurality's and Justice Douglas's reasoning but concurred on the
ground that the seminal act of state case, Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino,"3 should be limited.114 Justice Brennan and three
others dissented, rejecting each of the three different grounds." 5 The
i Id. at 117.
lo 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
HO The act of state doctrne prevents the courts of one nation from passing judgment on
the domestic actions of another nation taken within the latter's territory. Underhill v. Her-
nandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
-' The name denves from Bernstem v. N.V Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-
Maatschappij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954).
112 First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 770-73 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring).
1" 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
14 First Nat'l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 773-76 (Powell, J., concurring m judgment).
Id. at 776-96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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case is like Wyman-Gordon m that there was a clear majority for
each step of an analysis that would have led to a different result
(applying the act of state doctrine), but that result did not occur
because the majorities were composed of different justices. 116 Despite
the "incoherent" nature of the law presented to lower courts, there
is no reason that they cannot apply it consistently In Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank'1 7 the Second Circuit
simply cumulated the views of the justices m First National City
Bank to arrive at the "phenomenological" rule that where there is
a Bernstein letter and where the claim was asserted as a counterclaim
and setoff and where Justice Powell's limited reading of Sabbatino
would permit it, the act of state doctrine does not apply."' In other
cases resulting in "incoherent" law, the lower courts need only "add
up" the opinions of the justices to ascertain the law 119 A "solution"
to the problem of incoherent rules is not necessitated by the incon-
sistency or the alleged mability of lower courts to follow precedent.
Second, Justice White's cure for incoherence, if that is what it
is supposed to be, is worse than the disease. It may be unseemly
for the Court's jurisprudence to be incoherent at times, but at least
the individual justices can remain coherent, and it would be even
less seemly to have justices voting against their own positions. More
fundamentally, voting against one's own position leads to the in-
consistency and indeterminacy that mere incoherence does not. In
order to examine why this is, one must first examine the effect of
what Justice White did. Is the precedential effect of the Union Gas
116 Presumably all the justices would have agreed that if (X) Bernstein letters are meffec-
five, and (Y) counterclaim status is irrelevant, and (Z) Sabbatino should not be limited, then
(r) the act of state doctrine should apply. Justice Rehnquist's three-judge plurality ruled not-
X therefore not-r. Justice Douglas ruled X and Z but not-Y therefore not-r. Justice Powell
ruled X and Y but not-Z therefore not-r. Justice Brennan's four-justice dissent ruled X and
Y and Z therefore r. Thus separate majorities of at least five justices ruled for each of X and
Y and Z, although the logical consequence of X and Y and Z is a different result from that
which occurred.
658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981).
" Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 884-85 (2d Cir.
1981); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chem. Bank New York Trust Co., 822 F.2d 230,
236 (2d Cir. 1987).
19 Another example, involving the fractured decision in National Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949), is Greene v. Teffeteller, 90 F.Supp. 387, 388
(E.D. Tenn. 1950) ("precedent is established by the votes of the justices, not by the reasons
given for their votes").
See Kelman, supra note 83, at 268. Professor Maltz has advocated that such an analysis
be used on a justice-by-justice basis. Maltz, The Concept of the Doctrine of the Court in
Constitutional Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 357 (1982).
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decision different because of his vote than it would have been had
there been the Wyman-Gordon-like anomaly that would have re-
sulted had he voted his convictions? This is impossible to answer
definitely because his action is so unprecedented. This necessitates
exanumng each possibility
The less plausible possibility, perhaps, is that the precedential
effect of Union Gas is the same regardless of which way Justice
White voted, since ins views on the congressional intent reflected by
CERCLA are clearly stated, presumably for the reason that this is
what he thinks about the issue. Why else state them? Lower courts
in subsequent cases can follow what he said and add up the votes
of the justices to reach their conclusions. The trouble with this is
that it leads to inconsistency- if an indistinguishable case were to be
presented to the lower court, and perhaps even to the Supreme
Court, a result different from Union Gas would occur. Different
results on indistinguishable facts are inconsistent. It is hard to accept
that Justice White's vote has no precedential effect; otherwise the
losing party in Union Gas would have been the victim of inconsistent
decisioninaking.
Let us assume on the other hand that Justice White's vote
changes the precedential effect of the decision. The law concerning
the eleventh amendment is now presumably more coherent. But this
occurs only because lower courts, in applying Union Gas, will treat
Justice White's vote as a majority vote binding upon them, despite
the fact that it was not supported by his reasoning. In order to
anticipate other Supreme Court votes, and thereby to conform rul-
ings to the Supreme Court's statement of the law, the lower court
must now try to anticipate when individual justices will vote against
their own positions. Apart from the triple-choice situation where the
meta-rule is clear,' ° there is no ascertainable basis for voting against
one's own position other than the very need to avoid the incoherence
that is now being discussed. But that basis would support deferring
to a majority in all cases where there is even the possibility of a
Wyman-Gordon-like result. The practice, as I have tried to show,
is overwhelmingly against this. If carried to extremes, it might even
mean there could be no dissenting votes.
At the very least, it would lead to anomalies arguably far worse
than what occurs now For instance, four justices could believe that
execution of a defendant is precluded by the fifth amendment but
12 See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
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not the eighth amendment, while four more justices might believe
that execution of a defendant is precluded by the eighth amendment
but not the fifth amendment. Only one justice rejecting both argu-
ments believes that the Constitution permits execution, but nonethe-
less off the defendant' goes to the gallows.121 This result cannot be
right. In at least some situations, then, the courts will inevitably
think in terms of a majority result rather than majority reasoning.
In addition, even if justices were to try to defer on every issue
in which they disagree with a majority on an issue, there would be
an enormous difficulty determining what is truly a different basis
for decision, and what is just a different way of saying the same
thing. Distinguishing those cases in which the concurrence is broader
or narrower or distinct m its reasoning from those in which the
concurrence was merely stating things differently from the plurality
is not easy It would be necessary in every case involving a plurality
opinion if general deference to majority reasoning were the rule.
Such a general rule is indefensible.
Thus, a rule becomes necessary for determining when justices
should defer. Any such rule must presumably reflect the underlying
reason for ever deferring. The only conceivable reason for deferring
requires deference to majority reasoning in all cases. That cannot
be right, and no other rule presents itself. 12 None was suggested by
Justice White, nor by Judge Easterbrook, nor by Professors Korn-
hauser and Sager. If the answer is "sometimes I do, sometimes I
don't," then we now have the mdetermnacy that the multi-member
121 Professor Leonard argues that such a result itself would violate due process. Leonard,
supra note 57, at 326-36.
'1 The votes of Justices Harlan and Blackmun in Vuitch may suggest the possibility that
deference to a disagreeing majority on an issue is appropriate where that issue is the jurisdiction
of the Court. Incoherence may be particularly unseemly when the very jurisdiction of the
Court depends m some sense on how some justices view the merits. The short answer to this
is that the Court's jurisdiction m tis sense was not at issue m Union Gas. And in a number
of the cases that I have used to show that the precedent is against such votes, one of the
issues was the jurisdiction of the Court, or more generally to the power of the Court, to
decide another issue. E.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S.
693 (1986); Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. at 759.
Moreover, a distinction between "jurisdictional" and "nonjunsdictional" issues would
have little content for these purposes. In a sense it is beyond the jurisdiction of a court to
make a judgment contrary to the law, and in this sense every issue is a jurisdictional issue.
And if "jurisdictional issue" simply means "threshold issue," then the definition is circular,
since no principle governs what issue is treated first. Even issues that we commonly think of
as threshold issues-such as the statutory power of a court to hear a case-ca logically be
assumed arguendo, thereby not treating them first. E.g., Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524,
532-33 (1976); cf. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 92-93 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(criticizing distinction between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional factual issues).
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nature of appellate courts formerly did not require. Not only is
there individual inconsistency in the act of voting against one's views
in the particular case, but there is now the court-level indeterminacy
that runs counter to the traditional conception of the judicial role.
This is too high a price for reducing incoherence.
CONCLUSION
In the end, why can't we just live with incoherence? It occurs
only in those cases where plurality opinions are possible. It is an
inherent cost of having multi-member courts attempting to make
consistent decisions. One conceivable alternative would be to have
single-member appellate courts. The result would sacrifice accuracy
for coherence. Regardless of how one defines "accuracy" m judicial
decision-makmg, 12 it is hard to doubt that a multi-member court is
more accurate in the long run than a single judge. There is snnply
more input. Moreover, reducing the number of Supreme Court
justices to one would reduce the already limited control that the
political branches have on the judiciary
Once we are committed to multi-member appellate courts, we
must accept the cost of occasional incoherence. Trying to avoid it
results in an indeterminate monstrosity At least with respect to
"anomalous" decisions like Wyman-Gordon (and as Union Gas
would have been, had Justice White voted his views), each particular
decision can be legitimated to the litigants on the ground that a
majority of Supreme Court justices, selected in constitutional fash-
ion, have interpreted the Constitution to require the decision made.
And unless there are different justices or justices change their minds
(possibilities under any system), a subsequent mdistmgushable case
will be decided the same way. Different results will occur only when
there is a distinguishing factor relevant to at least some of the
justices. Of course the distingmshing factor may be considered rel-
evant by fewer than a majority of the justices. But this fact will be
present only in those cases where the Constitution is sufficiently
unclear that there is a dispute on its meaning among the other
justices. Decision-making in these circumstances certainly can retain
the acceptance of the polity.
In contrast, avoiding the possibility of incoherence in individual
cases will undermine the legitimacy of the courts. Litigants will lose
particular cases that a majority of justices have reasoned they should
12 See Kornhauser and Sager, supra note 85, at 84-97.
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win. But this will not always happen, and no principle will even
arguably control when future litigants will win in cases that are m
varying degrees analogous to previous cases. This can only under-
mine respect for the courts as bodies assigned by the Constitution
the task of "saying what the law is." It is in this sense that Justice
White's vote in Union Gas is so profoundly troubling.' 24
12 Following preparation of this article, Justice Kennedy voted against his own position
in Arizona v. Fulmifiante, - U.S. -, 59 U.S.L.W 4235 (U.S., March 26, 1991). The
issue was whether a criminal conviction could be upheld where an allegedly coerced confession
had been admitted into evidence at trial. Only four justices (White, Marshall, Blackmun, and
Stevens) agreed that both (X) the confession was coerced, and (Y) admission of the confession
was not harmless error. 59 U.S.L.W at 4236-37 and 4239-41. Yet both conclusions are
logically required to throw out the conviction. Justice Scalia agreed with X but not Y, while
Justice Kennedy agreed with Y but not X. Logically, Justice Kennedy should have voted to
uphold the conviction, but he did not. (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor held
not-X and not-Y; Justice Souter held not-X. These three and Justice Scalia accordingly
voted to uphold the conviction.)
In a concurrence, Justice Kennedy justified his vote as follows:
In the interest of providing a clear mandate to the Arizona Supreme Court
in this capital case, I deem it proper to accept in the case now before us the
holding of five Justices that the confession was coerced and madmssible. I agree
with a majority of theCourt that admission of the confession could not be
harmless error when viewed m light of all the other evidence; and so I concur
in the judgment to affirm the ruling of the Arizona Supreme Court [throwing
out the conviction].
59 U.S.L.W at 4244 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Of course the mandate to the Arizona
Supreme Court would have been just as clear (to uphold the conviction) had Justice Kennedy
voted in accordance with his view that the confession was not coerced. See text accompanying
notes 109-19.
This leaves only the argument that Fulminante was a capital case. But voting against one's
position in a different capital case could result in upholding an otherwise invalid conviction,
rather than vice versa. See text accompanying note 121, supra. It could be that a justice
should only vote against his or her reasoning in order to throw out convictions in capital
cases, but not to uphold convictions. Such a one-way rule would amount to a "tilt" on a
substantive constitutional issue-a tilt that is not express, but rather embedded in the decisional
structure.

